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Abstract 
In this paper, we try to study the determinants of the banks' capital ratio in an emerging country. To do 
so, we model the relationships between some variables of the banks and this ratio. Our aim is to explain 
its high level. We try also to answer to a new question. Is it affected by the same factors in the 
emerging countries as in the industrialized ones?   
The sample is composed of 18 banks. The data are half yearly. The period sample is from 2002 to 2008.  
We find that the interest margin and the risk affect strongly the capital ratio. They explain the excess of 
the capital held by the Tunisian banks. So, this excess is not explained only by regulatory pressures. 
The deposit variability and the intermediation rate have the same sign. But, the equity cost and the 
deposits ratio both have a negative impact.  The main determinants are the same for all the countries. 
 
Keywords: Capital ratio, commercial bank, capital determinants, capital structure, developing 
countries.            
 
1. Introduction 
The financial intermediation specificity and the regulation make the commercial banks different from 
the non financial firms.  Marques and Santos (2003) stated that capital regulation is the first external 
determinant of the banks’ capital structure. Many other authors arrived at the same conclusion. This 
may be true in developed countries. But in developing small countries, there are no enough studies that 
show this influence.  If the Basel rules are imposed on the commercial banks over the world, their 
influences must be the same, whatever the size of the banks. Consequently, only one theoretical 
approach must be observed in the banking industry.   
The Commercial banks hold capital because they are required to do so by authorities. Nevertheless, the 
capital level is determined by the bank   requirements, by the risk and by the capital cost. With high 
equity cost, bank managers try to hold the minimum capital required. However, if the risk taken is high 
they must increase the capital. 
Schaeck and Čihák (2007) stated that if banks operate in a competitive environment, they tend to hold a 
higher capital ratio.  This is consistent with the idea that if an economy is bank-based, the competition 
degree in the capital markets is week. This may be the case of the Tunisian banking market.  
Murinde and Yaseen (2004) found that the capital requirements affect commercial banks’ capital 
decisions in the MENA region. They said that regulatory pressure did not induce banks to increase their 
capital.  
Brewer et al. (2008) demonstrated that if the banking sector is relatively small, the banks maintain a 
higher capital adequacy ratio. When the authorities practice prompts corrective actions, this ratio is 
high too. 
The capital structure of small banks operating in a local market has not been enough investigated. So, 
we will try to analyze empirically the validity of the banks’ capital theory in an emerging country. This 
will allow us to test the universality of the rules and the relationships demonstrated by the previous 
studies.        
We will analyze those relationships in the Tunisian commercial banks by applying a linear model. We 
insert two new variables not tested in previous empirical studies: The deposit variability and the 
intermediation rate which represent the banking activity. Rapid deposits variability characterizes the 
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Tunisian banks. It may directly affect their capital ratio.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will present the Tunisian banking 
characteristics. The third section is devoted to the literature of capital structure in commercial banks.  
In the fourth section, we will analyze empirically the determinants of capital ratio in Tunisian banks. 
The main results are drawn in the fifth section. The conclusion constitutes the sixth section.  
 
2. Tunisian Banking Characteristics 
The Tunisian banking industry is small.  In 2010, there are 30 small domestic commercial banks. They 
are based in Tunis and big towns. The three first largest banks are state owned. It is characterized by its 
high degree of concentration. In fact, the public banks hold more than half of total market share.  In this 
case, the authorities can easily influence their strategies and their decisions. As displayed in Table 1, 
large public banks hold often less capital than the private ones. After the reforms, the Tunisian banks 
have adopted a new governance system. It is the same as those of European banks. They are well 
managed and well organized. 
Tunisia’s banks are actively involved with European banks. In addition to financial flows, some foreign 
banks have shares in the capital of Tunisian banks. 
Capital requirements in Tunisia have been dictated by Basel I. Basel I rules had started to be applied in 
1992. It was 5% of risk weighted assets, and then it rose to 8% in 1999. The recorded rates were 
between 8.4% and 13.4%. They were so high. 
During the sample period, the annual capital ratio was as shown in Table 1. 
For small as for large banks, the capital ratio was often higher than that required one. As noted by 
Berger et al. (2008), the excess of equity makes it difficult to any analyst to tell how banks manage 
their capital. For Tunisian banks, the problem of adjustment did not arise.  This is due to the banks' 
policies. They adopted risky loan strategies, and they increased their equity to escape the regulator 
pressures.   
Table 1 shows that since 2004, the private banks’ ratio is higher than that of public banks. This can be 
explained by the large size of the stated owned banks. Their size had notably increased after their 
mergers with the development banks. Moreover, they are often sustained by the authorities. 
It is noted that during the same period, Trier 1 was higher than the minimum imposed by Basel I.  
The notable increase of the capital ratio is due to the 2001 law. All the Tunisian banks increased their 
capital by issuing of new shares. During the last decade, their average ROE was 13%. Their rate of 
earnings' retention was high. This had led to an increase in equity.     
As it has been pointed out above, the Tunisian banks adopt new methods of management, and they 
apply the international prudential rules. However, they are not as large and powerful as the American or 
the European banks.  Compared to those banks, Tunisian banks are too small. Their total asset is equal 
or lower than these of a single bank in a developed country. In Tunisia, the banking sector is small. It 
has some characteristics: the number of banks is very limited, the dominant banks are public and the 
concentration degree is high. With these specificities, the Tunisian banks may differ from those of other 
countries. 
These specificities lead us to ask several questions: If the banks’ capital ratios were often high, why did 
the authorities impose the Basel ratio? Does the level of equity constitute a result of other factors 
specific to Tunisian banks? Are the determinants of capital ratio the same in emerging countries as in 
developed ones? 
The capital structure of small banks operating in a local market has not been enough investigated. So, 
we will try to analyze empirically the validity of the banks’ capital theory in an emerging country. This 
will allow us to test the universality of the rules and the relationships demonstrated by the previous 
studies.        
 
3. Banks’ Capital Structure 
3.1 Theoretical Fundamentals 
For the firms, two main alternative theories are identified for their capital structure: the Trade-off and 
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the Pecking Order. The first holds that the capital structure is determined by the trade off between the 
benefits and the debts ' costs. The second holds that the short run costs exceed the benefits of adjusting 
the capital structure. Thus, firms rely first on retained earnings and then on the debts. They issue stocks 
only if the marginal costs of the additional debts exceed the costs of this new issuing. The commercial 
banks prefer first the retained earnings. The pecking order theory suggests that the dividend provides a 
good signal about the future prospects of the firm. So, the managers will issue new equity as there is 
less information asymmetry in the capital market. 
For the banks, the subjects relating to the problems of the liquidity creation and the loan risk were 
considered a priority for a long time.   The capital structure of the banks has not been considered as an 
important topic.  Marques and Santos (2003) considered that the studies on the bank's capital are very 
limited. In fact, the issue has not been treated for long years. There are two reasons to think that the 
capital ratio does not deserve to be studied. The first is the absence of limits for the deposits. The 
second is the ease of the access to the capital market. 
Baltensperger (1973) stated that the banks maximize their profit when the mix liabilities equity is 
optimal. Then, they have to hold an appropriate capital ratio. In this case, their deposits and their loan 
ratios are optimal too.  
Kohen and Santomero (1980) demonstrated that a regulation based only on the “equity /assets” ratio 
cannot necessarily lead to the expected results. They proposed a ratio with weighted risk assets. They 
cited other determinants: The deposit growth, the asset size and the revenue.     
For Brewer et al. (2008), under regulation, the capital ratio may be determined by one or other of these 
theories. The trade-off assumptions with binding regulation have a testable prediction. In instance, if 
there is only one ratio, banks should operate above the required minimum. The Pecking order 
hypothesis assigns a significant role to the government rules. 
With nonbinding regulation hypotheses, the both theories have the same results.   They retain that the 
market forces have an important role. In fact, they determine the cushion banks seek to maintain their 
capital over the minimum. 
Gropp and Heider (2007) found that the determinants of the capital of the firms are also significant for 
the banks. 
 
3.2 Banking Capital Theory After Basel I 
After the application of the Basel I rules, the issue of the capital ratio attracted the researchers in 
developed countries. In the last two decades, several studies are carried out. Their aim is to explain the 
relationships between this ratio and some internal and external variables. 
Berger et al. (1995) stated that the theory of capital structure of the firms cannot be fully applied to the 
financial institutions. This is due to the regulation. They also pointed to the importance of external 
factors that affect the capital of the banks. 
Diamond and Rajan (2000), affirmed that the high capital reduces the creation of liquidity by the bank. 
But it enables them to be solid and to avoid the bankruptcy. 
Why do commercial banks hold often more capital than the minimum required?  Does it mean that their 
economic capital is determined by the intermediation volume? Or it is determined by their risk level? 
For Alfon et al. (2005), the capital adequacy is a positive signalling for the market and for all the 
partners to modify their perceptions.  Asarkaya and Ozcan (2007) pointed out that when economic 
growth is high, the banks make more profit.  This profit may contribute to their capital increase. So, 
they hold more capital. These authors stated that with the Basel I accord, the notion of capital used in 
the approach of risk based capital could not adequately explain the bank’s capacity to compensate the 
losses. They also pointed out that the risk criteria that they employed were not satisfactory. Certainly, 
the managers of the commercial banks realized this reality. To guard themselves against the risks, they 
take care that the capital ratio is high.   
Gropp and Heider (2007) found that the profitable banks tend to have relatively more equity. Their 
findings are consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory.   
Kleff and Weber (2008) demonstrated that the capital level is positively correlated with the profit. The 
accumulation of the profit breeds the capital growth.   
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Brewer et al. (2008) pointed out that for the banks, the use of the equity should be determined by the 
same set of forces that influence other firms. But the combined impacts of the government safety net 
policies and the regulation must be taken in account.    
The findings of Ahmad et al. (2009) for Malaysian banks are inconsistent with the previous results. 
They demonstrated that the earnings affect negatively the capital ratio. For them, these findings 
contradict the view that a high ratio (earnings/franchise value) provides the managers an easy access to 
equity. High earnings may cause bank management to reduce capital cushioning accordingly.  
Most of the previous studies demonstrated that the regulation is not the unique determinant of the 
capital ratio. There are many other macroeconomic and banks’ specific Determinants.   They are rather 
numerous and they have a power in explaining the variation of this ratio. 
Further the regulation, the main determinants are: The profitability, the capital cost, the risk, the 
deposits and the asset size.  
 
4. Empirical analysis of the Tunisian banking industry 
4.1 Sample and Data 
We employed half-yearly data from the Tunisian banking industry for the period January 2002-
December 2008. The data are obtained from financial statements published by banks and from 
quarterly and annual reports of central bank of Tunisia. This period was selected to observe the 
determinants of the bank capital ratios after the 2001 reform.  Many banks have increased their capital 
after this reform. There were many mergers and, during this period, strange commercial banks became 
shareholders in Tunisian banks.  
This factor makes it difficult to adjust the previous data to make them comparable to the data collected 
after 2001. For all relating variables to be used in our regressions, each bank must have data for seven 
years. 
In addition, we excluded two banks recently created, the development banks and all other development 
banks recently transformed into deposit banks.  After this selection, our final sample contains 18 
commercial banks. 
For empirical regression, the equity cost is annual because the dividend is annual. We consider that for 
the first half year, the cost of equity is the same as that of the second period of the previous year. The 
cost for the second half year is determined for the same year. With this temporal shift, each cost will be 
used twice times, but in two different years.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics for the independent variables. 
The means of the variables are presented in Table 2 by six months. The banks of our sample have an 
average of capital ratio of 11.37%.  
The Risk was very high although its decrease from 18.6% in the first half of 2002, to 16.4% in the 
second half of 2008. The Tunisian commercial banks finance more and more the risky activities.  For 
the sample period, its average is 17.3%.  
The equity cost decreased over time from 12.8% in 2002 to 9.51% in the second half of 2008. This is 
due to the increase more than proportional of equity compared to the dividend.  
The mean of the ratio “term deposits/demand deposits” is around 55% and it has increased since 2002.  
In 2008, it is around 65%. The stability of the deposits improved, but their average cost increased. The 
interest margin rate recorded small semi-annual increases and its average is around 8.73% during the 
sample period.  
The intermediation rate has improved for all the banks, essentially for the large banks. Its average is 
74%.    
The size of the assets of the banks of our sample has increased over the period 2002 - 2008.   
Demand deposit variability has increased with constant rhythms. This means that the share of the 
deposits in liabilities has dropped. It was 48.23% in the first half of 2002 and it increased to 63.74% in 
2008, for all the commercial banks. Its average is 57.67%. 
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The average capital ratio of the banks has been higher than the minimum required over time. It was 
around 10.6% in 2002 and around 11.2% at the end of 2008. Its mean is around 10.93%. 
Table 4 displays the correlation matrix of the variables of the model. It shows that three variables are 
negatively correlated with capital ratio. They are the deposit ratio, the equity cost and the asset size. 
The negative sign of the variable size means that the larger banks have lower capital ratio.  All the other 
variables are positively correlated with the capital. 
 
4.3 The Model 
The general empirical regression is specified as follows: 
                    Yit   = λ0   + Σ λj Xjit    +    εit                             (1) 
Where,       
Yit is the capital ratio in time t for the bank i 
λ0 is  a constant 
Xjit is the jth explanatory variable for the ith bank in period t 
λj is the parameter to estimate 
εit is  the error term 
 
4.3.1 Empirical Specification and Methodology 
          Our model helps to determinate the capital ratio of bank i at time t. We will use the standard 
capital determinants as explanatory variables. Market value is used only for equity. The equity cost is 
approximated by the ratio “dividend/equity”.  The deposit ratio measures the structure of the deposits.  
To allow a better comparison, the assets must be adjusted by the consumer price index. 
We exclude the external economic variables. They may be correlated with the bank specific factors. 
The variable regulation is excluded too. Its elimination is justified by the very high capital ratios during 
the sample period. This will allow us to highlight the effects of the banks’ specific variables. 
We propose two new bank specific variables:  The intermediation rate and the deposit variability. 
 
4.3.1.1 Deposit Variability 
The variability of demand deposits has an impact on the liquidity of the banks and on their insolvency 
risk. A high variability may be a synonym of the weakness of the financial resources.  It is the case 
when the proportion of the term deposits is low.  If this situation is accompanied with a rather great 
loans portfolio, the banks would be obliged to increase their capital.  
This variable can be approximated by the ratio “outflows of deposits/inflows of deposits” of the period. 
When outflows are higher than inflows, the variability is speedy.    
The analysis of the deposits’ movements of all the banks shows that for the households and the small 
savers, it increases remarkably in summer and during the month of Ramadan and at the end of the year. 
For all banks’ customers, this variability is cyclical. It has an influence on the structure of loans.  
Indeed, the faster is this variability, the more the banks grant short-term credits.   
More there are cheaper deposits, more intermediation brings back profits. But when the share of 
deposit decreases, the banks will borrow at a higher cost. This decrease can be compensated by debts 
and by additional equity. 
In our model, we retain the average of the ratios recorded for each six month period. It is expected that 
it influences negatively the capital ratio.  
 
4.3.1.2 Intermediation Rate 
This variable is determined by the ratio “Total loans / total deposits". It represents the volume of 
activity of the banks.  The more this rate is high, the more the bank are efficient, and the more it is able 
to profit from economies of scale.  
A high intermediation rate means that the bank grants more loans. Its liquidity risk and its loans losses 
may be high. We expect that this rate influences positively the capital ratio. 
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4.3.1.3 Panel equation 
It is written as follows: 
Capitalit =   λ0 + λ 1 RISKit +  λ 2 IMRit + λ3 COEQit  + λ 4 DEPVARit + λ5 INTRATit 
                  +  λ 6 DEPRi,t  +  λ  7 AVCPt  + λ8  ln ASSZi,t   +  εit                    (2) 
Where,  
Capital:  The capital ratio for bank i at period t. 
RISK:  The ratio “loans loss reserve/loans” for bank i at time t. 
IMR:  Interest margin rate is the ratio inflation-adjusted “net interest margin / Asset” for bank i at 
period t.   
COEQ:   Cost of equity for bank i at period t. 
DEPVAR:  The demand deposits variability approximated by the ratio “deposits inflows/deposits 
outflows” for bank i at period t. 
INTRAT: Intermediation rate for bank i at period t measured by the ratio “loans/ deposits”. 
DEPR: Is the ratio “term deposit/ demand deposit” for bank i at time t. 
AVCP:  The average capital adequacy ratio of all the banks of the sample at period t. 
ASSZ:  The size of the bank measured by total assets adjusted by the consumer price index. It is the 
natural log of total assets. 
εit : The error term. 
 
4.3.4 Multicollinearity Test 
To detect multicollinearity, we determinate the variance inflation factor (VIF) of the independent 
variable. The VIF measures how much the variance of a coefficient (square of the standard deviation) is 
increased because of collinearity. 
R-squared and VIF of our model’s independent variables are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 shows that none of the R-squared are near to 1.0. The variance of inflation factor (VIF) is 
always less than 5. Thus, there is no multicollinearity problem. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Results Significance 
Table 6 reports the regression results. We employ the Hausman specification to test whether the 
individual random effects are correlated with explanatory variables or not. The Breussch-Pagan 
Lagragian multiplier is used to test the significance of random effect in the model. It is also used to test 
the validity of the exogeneity of the explanatory variables.    
The null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the unobserved individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variable. For our study, the within estimator is the best to perform.  
According to Baltagi (1995), the random effects model FGLS estimates the error variance–covariance 
matrix. It assumes that the errors follow a panel specific autoregressive process. In the same time, the 
variance of the error is allowed to be different across units. He pointed out that the fixed effects model 
is appropriate when focusing on a specific set of N firms and when the inference is restricted to their 
behavior. In our study, this model is performed to make comparisons with previous studies. Both 
models will be run using feasible general least squares (FLGS) estimators. 
It is worth noting that the signs of the coefficients are similar for all the regressions. In fact, we see that 
in the columns (1) (2) and (3), most of the coefficients magnitudes have not changed significantly. 
The Table 6 shows that only three variables are negatively correlated with the dependent variable: The 
deposits ratio, the equity cost and the asset size. All the other variables are positively correlated with 
the capital ratio.  
With the p-values significance of all the explanatory variables, we estimate that our model is a reliable. 
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The variance analysis shows that there is a strong relationship between all the explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable. 
 
5.2 Relationships’ Signs 
The Asset size has a negative sign.  So, it influences capital in the opposite direction. As it is shown in 
the Table 6, this variable might have an important impact on the equity level. This result is explained 
by the great increase of the total assets of all the Tunisian banks since 2002. The average rate of this 
increase is higher than that of the capital.   
Our result is in accordance with those found by Alfon et al. (2005), Asarkaya and Ozcan (2007) and 
Gropp and Heider (2007). For Tunisian banks, this can be explained by the fact that the large banks 
have more depositors. The public banks have a lower ratio, because they have easy access to the 
financial market. 
The sign of the deposits ratio coefficient is negative. A high deposits ratio means that the banks have 
more stable resources. Consequently, the share of all the deposits in the liabilities is high too.  
However, when the deposit ratios are high, the banks have costly deposits. But this cost remains lower 
than the cost of all the other funds. Therefore, the capital may relatively decrease. 
According to the results of our regression, the banks that take higher risks have a higher capital ratio.  
They need to hold more capital to provide a buffer against losses. It is the same result as those of Rime 
(2001), Asarkaya and Ozcan (2007) and Gropp and Heider (2007).  The coefficient of the variable 
“Risk” is the smallest. That means that risk influences the capital ratio less than the other variables. 
The coefficients of the equity cost are high. As Alfon et al. (2005), we find that it has a negative impact 
on capital. The Tunisian banks yearly pay a relatively important dividend. In this case, banks may be 
encouraged to have more loans because of the high equity cost. 
Table 6 shows that the interest margin rate is significant at the 0.05 level in explaining the capital ratio.   
In our regression, its coefficients are positive and higher than all the other coefficients. Thus, earnings 
and capital are strongly related. The profitability is the first determinant of capital structure in Tunisian 
banks. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), and Kuo and Lee (2003) found the same strong 
relationship.  
There may be two way causalities between the equity cost and the interest margin rate in one hand, and 
the dependant variable in another one. Indeed, a higher profitability can infer an increase of the equity 
cost. In this case, the stockholders may require an increase of their dividends. The managers must 
determine the optimal retained earnings in order to increase capital to the desired level. This result 
shows that the Pecking order theory seems to be verified in the Tunisian banks. 
We notice that the signs of the deposit ratio and the demand deposit variability are opposite. Table 6 
shows that deposit variability has more influence on capital level.  The deposit ratio has improved, but 
it has not compensated the increase of the demand deposits variability.  This explains why the capital 
ratio has increased during the sample period.  
The intermediation rate is significant at the 0.05 level.  It influences positively the capital ratio. Its 
coefficient is high. This is due to the increase of the volume of   activity. This evolution leads to higher 
risks and best profits. With These improvements, the equity might increase. 
The sector average ratio is significant at the 0.01 level.  A high average ratio may influence managers 
in increasing the capital. Each bank tries to have a ratio capital near or equal to the average. Its aim is 
to send a positive signal to the market and to the authorities. For commercial banks, there are self 
incentives to raise their capital. They seek to avoid the successive interferences by the central bank.     
 
6. Conclusion 
This study extends those carried out for the bank's capital ratio in the developed countries.  We tried to 
explain the relationships between the capital ratio and the bank's variables. The proposed model has 
eight variables. 
All our findings are in line with those of the p studies curried out in the industrial countries. Therefore, 
the relations developed in theory in the developed countries are also observed in the emerging ones. 
The risk and the revenue have a positive impact on the dependent variable. They are significant in 
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explaining the bank’s capital excess.  This excess is not due only to regulatory pressures. 
The improvement of the intermediation rate and the asset size leads to a higher ratio.  All the banks 
adjust it to make it close to the average. So, their capital increases. 
The increase in the cost of equity reduces the capital. The deposit variability and the ratio of deposits 
have a negative effect on the capital.  
The annual rates of the funds increase give us an idea on the financing order. The banks rely firstly on 
the deposits.  Then, they raise their equity and finally, they make use of debts. This order is justified by 
the costs of the funds and by the high ROE. Thus, a specific Pecking Order seems to be verified in the 
Tunisian banks. 
During the last decade, the rate of growth was high. All the banks had to finance the investments. So, 
their loans and their risk increased. This explains why their capital ratios were high. 
If we take to account the economic conditions, the results might change. The bank's index of the 
management efficiency may affect the equity level. It is a new research question. 
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       Table 1: Tunisian banks’ Capital ratio (%) 
Ratios 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Banking industry capital ratio 9.6 9.3 11.6 12.4 11.3 11.0 11.2 
Private banks capital ratio 8.9 8.4 12.4 13.4 12.1 11.5 11.8 
Public banks capital ratio 10.2 10.8 10.1 10.0 9.3 10.0 10.3 
         Source: Central bank of Tunisia and APB annual reports. 
 
       Table 2(a): Half annual means of variables 
Variables 2002-
1 
2002-2    2003-1   2003-2     2004-1    2004-2   2005-1  
Capital ratio 9.73   9.89      10.37 10.76 11.08 11.32 11.54 
Risk 18.60 18.50    18.20 18.40 18.30 18.50 18.10 
Net margin interest   8.24 8.32 8.49 8.64 8.71 8.63 8.85 
Equity cost     12.41 11.12 11.12 11.05 11.05 10.83 10.83 
Ratio of deposits      48.23 48.58 49.86 50.16 51.79 52.34 54.42 
Deposit variability   52.11 53.23 53.16 54.37 55.24 56.48 57.64 
Intermediation rate   65.32 65.92 67.69 68.08 68.49 70.83 71.26 
Ratio of the Sector   10.62 10.87 11.39 10.74 11.36 13.71 12.58 
Asset size          13.82 13.34     14.53 14.61 15.08 14.70 15.24 
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       Table 2(b): Half annual means of variables  
Variables 2005-2   2006-1 2006-2 2007-1 2007-2 2008-1 2008-2 
Capital ratio 11.59 11.42   12.54 12.73     12.68     11.67 11.91   
Risk 17.80 17.70 17.20 16.90 17.10 16.70 16.40 
Net margin interest    8.93 8.86 9.07 8.98 9.12 9.21 9.38 
Equity cost     10.31 10.31 9.96 9.96 9.78 9.78 9.51 
Ratio of deposits      56.12 55.09 55.94 61.60 62.89 63.47 64.54 
Deposit variability    58.90 59.31 59.56 60.27 60.86 62.59 63.74 
Intermediation rate    72.14 72.76 72.88 72.44 73.57 74.71 75.62 
Ratio of the Sector   11.01 11.68 11.85 10.47 9.83 11.27 11.18 
Asset size          15.67 15.88    15.69   15.93   16.05   16.42    16.46     
RISK:  the ratio “bank provision/loans”  
IMR:     interest margin rate is the ratio inflation-adjusted “interest margin / Assets”.   
COEQ:   Cost of equity approximated by “Dividend/market value equity” 
DEPVAR:   the demand deposits variability approximated by the ratio “outflows of deposits 
/inflows”  
INTRAT: intermediation rate approximated by the ratio “loans /deposits” 
DEPR: is the ratio “term deposit/ demand deposit”  
AVCP:  the average capital adequacy ratio of all the banks of the sample,  
       ASSZ:  the size of assets adjusted by the consumer price index. It is the natural log of total 
assets. 
 
  Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Means Std Dev  Min Max 
Capital ratio 11.3764 2.8943 8.64 12.98 
Risk 17.3634 11.0164 38.73 72.47 
Net margin interest 8.8164 3.6178 7.84 12.34 
Equity cost 9.4437 2.9452 8.41 10.83 
Ratio of deposits 55.4314 16.2687 39.23 72.38 
Deposit variability 57.6715 17.2657 48.23 63.74 
Intermediation rate 74.1664 14.5254 67.68 93.26 
Ratio of the Sector 10.9362 2.3173 10.80 11.90 
Asset size 15.6428 5.6128 13.34 16.46 
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Table 4: Correlation matrix for dependent and explanatory variables 
              Capital ratio   Risk   IMR    COEQ   DPER    DEPVAR   INTRAT   ASEZ   AVCP 
Capital ratio       1       
Risk            0.4474      1 
IMR            0.5464    0.4326      1 
COEQ         -0.2548    0.1496   0.0986       1 
DPER         -0.1897    0.0687   0.2876    -0.1879     1 
DEPVAR      0.2167    0.1092   -0.0832    0.1427  -0.0169      1 
INTRAT       0.2452    0.0957   -0.2417   -0.2417   0.1528   -0.8246       1 
ASEZ         -0.0742    0.0508   0.0529    -0.0537   0.0884   -0.0031    -0.0568      1 
AVCP  0.0937   -0.3112    0.0713   -0.1818   0.0233   -0.0697    0.0286    -0.0162       1 
  
                Table 5: Multicollinearity Test 
Variables R-squared VIF 
Risk 
Net margin interest 
Equity cost 
Ratio of deposits 
Deposit variability 
Intermediation rate 
Ratio of the Sector 
Asset size 
0.195247 
  0.426832 
0.119425 
0.315139 
0.438634 
 0.463956 
   0.528914 
   0.628545 
1.242617299 
1.744689166 
  1.135621608 
 1.460150307 
  1.781369017 
  1.865518502 
  2.122754465 
  2.692116137 
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Table 6: Regression results 
Explanatory  variables 
Regression model 
Fixed effects (within) Fixed effects(FGLS) Random effects (FGLS) 
Constant 20.4568 (7.5249) ***   9.4685 (3.9246) *   8.8533 (3.7654) *** 
Risk   0.0842 (0.0157) *   0.0598 (0.0107) **   0.0748 (0.0144) ** 
Net margin interest 0.2758 (0.1856) **     0.1985 (0.1036) **   0.2151 (0.1462) *** 
Equity cost   -0.1742  (0.1286) **  -0.1637 (0.0787) ***  -0.1389 (0.4673) *** 
Ratio of deposits -0.0819 (0.0294) *** -0.1048 (0.0384) ***  -0.0962 (0.0216) ***  
Deposit variability 0.1335 (0.05179) *      0.1537 (0.4642) ***   0.1623 (0.6174) ***  
Interrmediation rate 0.1172(0.0567)**      0.1242(0.0587)*   0.1058(0.0463)** 
Ratio of the Sector  0.0986 (0.0465) *** 0.1179 (0.0409) ***   0.0914 (0.0319) *** 
Asset size   -0.1442 (0.0856) **     -0.1318 (0.0964) **  -0.1121 (0.0886) ** 
Wald chi 2     1742.38       537.92 
R- Squared 0.6724       0.6229  
Within 0.7427       0.6927  
Between overall 0.7182         0.7463 
F-test (p-value)  0            0 0 
Nb observation  80          80  
Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level. 
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